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ABSTRACT
The controversy over whether and how much to charge for health products in the developing world
rests, in part, on whether higher prices can increase use, either by targeting distribution to high-use
households (a screening effect), or by stimulating use psychologically through a sunk-cost effect. We
develop a methodology for separating these two effects. We implement the methodology in a field
experiment in Zambia using door-to-door marketing of a home water purification solution. We find






















Non-pro￿t approaches to the distribution of health products in developing countries are often
grouped into ￿social marketing￿and ￿public health￿categories, with the former emphasizing retail
sales and the latter emphasizing free distribution through health clinics. Advocates of the public
health approach often object to the use of prices to mediate distribution. Critics of pricing argue
that ￿charging people for basic health care...[is] unfair￿(Benn, 2006), and that fees ensure that
goods only reach ￿the richest of the poor￿(McNeil, 2005). Advocates of pricing counter that ￿when
products are given away free, the recipient often does not value them or even use them￿(PSI, 2006).
The latter argument is commonly interpreted to mean that higher prices cause greater product
use through a sunk-cost e⁄ect (Thaler, 1980; Eyster, 2002). An equally plausible interpretation,
however, is a screening e⁄ect: that higher prices skew the composition of buyers towards households
with a greater propensity to use the product (Roy, 1951; Oster, 1995).
Each of these e⁄ects is of broader economic interest￿ the former as a central prediction of
psychology and economics, and the latter as an implication of the allocative role of prices. Isolating
them may also help to clarify the terms of the ongoing policy debate over product pricing. However,
the two e⁄ects are intrinsically unidenti￿ed in standard observational data: both imply that as
prices rise, buyers use more. Evidence on the sunk-cost hypothesis has therefore been con￿ned
largely to hypothetical choices and a single, small-scale ￿eld experiment (Arkes and Blumer, 1985).
Clean evidence that higher product prices select households with a greater likelihood of using the
product is similarly limited.
In this paper, we present evidence on the e⁄ect of prices on product use from a large-scale
￿eld experiment in Zambia involving Clorin, an inexpensive, socially marketed disinfectant. Our
experimental design allows us to separately identify screening and sunk-cost e⁄ects, and our setting
allows us to measure product use objectively, without relying solely on household self-reports. We
￿nd strong evidence for screening e⁄ects: households with a greater willingness to pay for Clorin
are also those most likely to use Clorin in their drinking water. By contrast, we ￿nd no evidence
for sunk-cost e⁄ects, and only weak evidence for a modi￿ed version of the sunk-cost hypothesis
suggested by practitioners.
Clorin is well-suited to the goals of our study. It is a chlorine bleach solution used to kill
2pathogens in household drinking water, and thus reduce the incidence of water-borne illnesses
(Quick et al, 2002). Its chemical composition makes it detectable by test strips similar to those used
in backyard pools, which permits us to avoid the pitfalls of relying solely on household self-reports
of use. Moreover, in Zambia, Clorin is a well-known, widely used product with an established retail
market, which serves to limit the informational role of prices, a potential confound to the e⁄ects of
interest. Finally, it is inexpensive, so that income e⁄ects (another potential confound) are relatively
unlikely.
Our main experimental intervention was a door-to-door sale of Clorin to about 1,000 households
in Lusaka. Each participating household was o⁄ered a single bottle of Clorin for a one-time only,
randomly chosen o⁄er price, which was at or below the prevailing retail price. Households that
agreed to purchase at the o⁄er price received an unanticipated, randomly chosen discount, thus
allowing us to vary the transaction price separately from the o⁄er price. About two weeks after
the marketing intervention, we conducted a follow-up survey in which we asked about Clorin use
and measured the chemical presence of Clorin in the household￿ s stored water.
In the paper, we lay out a simple model of Clorin use. Households di⁄er in the costs and
bene￿ts of using Clorin in their drinking water, about which they are partially informed at the
time of purchase. Households base their purchase decisions on the expected value (bene￿ts net of
costs) of using Clorin and on the o⁄er price, and agree to buy when the expected value of using
Clorin in drinking water is high. The model therefore predicts a screening e⁄ect: the higher is the
o⁄er price, the more the set of buyers is selected on their expected value from using Clorin, and
hence the more likely are buyers to use Clorin in their drinking water.
We allow for psychological e⁄ects of prices by adopting Eyster￿ s (2002) framework, which as-
sumes a desire for consistency. In this framework, households pay a psychological cost if they
purchase Clorin and do not use it in their drinking water. The magnitude of the psychological cost
depends on how much better o⁄ the household would have been had it not bought Clorin; i.e., on
the amount paid for Clorin. Households can avoid that cost by using Clorin in their drinking water,
thus validating their decision to purchase Clorin in the ￿rst place. The model therefore predicts
a sunk-cost e⁄ect: for a given o⁄er price, greater transaction prices result in a stronger desire to
rationalize one￿ s purchase decision, and hence greater use in drinking water.
3Under the assumptions of the model, then, our two-stage pricing design solves the core identi￿-
cation problem, allowing us to test separately for screening and sunk-cost e⁄ects. Varying the o⁄er
price for a given transaction price allows us to test for a screening e⁄ect of prices on the mix of
buyers, holding constant the psychic cost of a failure to use Clorin in drinking water. Varying the
transaction price for a given o⁄er price then tests for a sunk-cost e⁄ect of prices on drinking-water
use, holding constant the selection of buyers.
We ￿nd strong evidence for screening e⁄ects: holding constant the transaction price, the house-
holds who agree to a higher o⁄er price are (statistically and economically) more likely to use Clorin
in their drinking water at follow-up. That is, higher willingness-to-pay for Clorin is associated
with a greater propensity to use. This holds true even when we condition on a range of house-
hold characteristics, suggesting that the component of willingness-to-pay that is uncorrelated with
observables is nevertheless highly predictive of Clorin use. In addition, some simple calculations
suggest that willingness-to-pay is more predictive of use than an optimal linear combination of
household characteristics observable as of the baseline survey. These ￿ndings indicate that house-
holds have substantial information about their use propensities that is not available directly to the
econometrician, and that this information plays an important role in their purchase decisions.
Turning to sunk-cost e⁄ects, we ￿nd no evidence that households paying a higher transaction
price are more likely to use Clorin in their drinking water, and some of our point estimates even
suggest the opposite. This is true even among households displaying the sunk-cost e⁄ect in hypo-
thetical choice scenarios. Our con￿dence intervals are tight enough to rule out e⁄ects of roughly
the same order of magnitude as the point estimates of the screening e⁄ect that we estimate. More-
over, although Clorin is a relatively inexpensive product, the variation in prices we induce in our
experiment is su¢ cient to generate a substantial e⁄ect on purchase probabilities, suggesting that
our failure to ￿nd sunk-cost e⁄ects may not be due to small stakes. Hence, our ￿ndings do not
support the model￿ s prediction of a sunk-cost e⁄ect. In response to practitioner suggestions, we
also test the hypothesis that paying something results in more use than paying nothing. Again, we
cannot rule out the null of no e⁄ect, although in this case the sign, magnitude, and cross-household
variation in point estimates are at least consistent with the hypothesized relationship.
On the whole, then, our results imply, at best, a limited role for sunk-cost e⁄ects in the domain
4of health product use, while providing strong support for the hypothesis that households have
private information about their use propensities that is re￿ ected in willingness-to-pay.
Our theoretical discussion suggests two caveats regarding the interpretation of these results.
First, we test for sunk-cost e⁄ects operating through the mechanism proposed in Eyster (2002).
Though Eyster￿ s model is the most fully articulated single-agent theory of sunk-cost e⁄ects of which
we are aware, reasonable alternatives exist with possibly di⁄erent empirical implications. We discuss
the robustness of our conclusions to alternative theories of sunk costs when we present the model.
Second, the interpretation of our results depends on assumptions about what happens to Clorin
that is purchased but not used in drinking water. The weight of the evidence indicates that Clorin
not used in drinking water is used for household cleaning (in place of bleach or detergent), but
our data are not de￿nitive. The model clari￿es how our results would be a⁄ected given alternative
assumptions about how Clorin is used when it is not used in drinking water.
Our paper makes several contributions to the existing literature. Methodologically, we imple-
ment the ￿rst ￿eld experiment to identify both screening and sunk-cost e⁄ects.1 Our two-stage
pricing design is a close cousin both to Arkes and Blumer￿ s (1985) study of the sunk-cost e⁄ect in
the use of theater tickets, and to Karlan and Zinman￿ s (2006) study of adverse selection and moral
hazard in the South African loan market. However, Arkes and Blumer￿ s (1985) design does not
attempt to identify the screening e⁄ect, and Karlan and Zinman￿ s (2006) design does not attempt
to identify sunk-cost e⁄ects.2
Substantively, we show that households base a health product purchase decision on private
information about their propensity to use the product. In addition to its more direct relevance to
the pricing of health products in developing countries, this ￿nding contributes to ongoing e⁄orts to
study the role of private information in health care (e.g., Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006) and other
domains (Karlan and Zinman, 2006). We also fail to ￿nd consistent evidence for sunk-cost e⁄ects
in only the second, and by far the largest, ￿eld experiment on sunk-cost e⁄ects to date.3 Ours is
1See Harrison and List (2004) for a review of ￿eld experiments in economics more generally.
2In Karlan and Zinman￿ s (2006) design, the discounted interest rate (analogous to our transaction price) directly
a⁄ects households￿marginal incentives to default (through moral hazard or repayment burden), whereas in our context
the transaction price is purely sunk.
3Eyster￿ s (2002) review identi￿es Arkes and Blumer￿ s (1985) as the only ￿eld study of sunk-cost e⁄ects to date.
While evidence from hypothetical choices supports the sunk-cost premise (Thaler, 1980; Arkes and Blumer, 1985),
evidence from incentivized laboratory behaviors is more mixed (Friedman et al, 2007).
5the ￿rst ￿eld study of sunk costs to include a treatment in which participants paid nothing for the
product,4 and the ￿rst to explicitly connect hypothetical choice responses and other measures of
psychological propensity to objectively measured ￿eld behaviors.5
Beyond its implications for social science, our study informs an important set of public policy
issues, from the pricing of health products in developing countries in particular (Kremer and Miguel,
2007)6 to non-pro￿t pricing strategy more generally.7 Clorin and related ￿point-of-use￿ water
puri￿cation systems hold promise as tools for addressing the lack of clean water facing over one
billion people (USAID, 2006; Thevos et al, 2002-2003; Kremer et al, 2006). As with many health
inputs, these tools rely on household behavior to produce desirable health outcomes (Grossman,
1972), implying that models of product use are likely to play an important role in the design and
implementation of policies relating to water puri￿cation.8
Several hurdles remain, however, in deriving ￿rm policy conclusions from our ￿ndings. First,
our data have the power to test the e⁄ects of pricing on drinking-water use of Clorin, not on the
incidence of water-borne illness, the ultimate outcome of interest. However, strong extant evidence
shows that home water puri￿cation solutions like Clorin can reduce the incidence of water-borne
illnesses (Quick et al, 2002), even in populations in which the use of alternative methods (such
as boiling) is reasonably common (Quick et al, 1999). Second, Clorin is a relatively inexpensive
health product, whereas much of the controversy surrounding social marketing has centered on more
expensive products such as insecticide-treated mosquito nets. Using an inexpensive product serves
to minimize income e⁄ects and hence to permit cleaner tests of the e⁄ects of interest. However,
4A number of existing papers explore the special role of zero prices, but none focuses on the e⁄ects on post-
purchase use. See, for example, Shampanier, Mazar and Ariely (2007), Thornton (forthcoming), and Karlan and List
(2007). More generally, our evidence contributes to existing research on the psychology of product pricing (see, e.g.,
Gourville and Soman, 2002; Shiv, Carmon and Ariely, 2005).
5In this sense, our study also contributes to a growing literature connecting laboratory and survey responses to
incentivized choices in markets (Fehr and Goette, 2007; Karlan, 2005; Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin, 2006).
6Though there have been some studies of the e⁄ectiveness of prices in encouraging product use in social marketing
contexts, existing research typically takes a non-experimental approach (Meekers, 1997; Maxwell et al, 2006). An
exception is Litvack and Bodart (1993), who study a natural experiment in which public health facilities in Cameroon
adopted both user fees and improved quality of care. Because of the simultaneous adoption of these two policies,
Litvack and Bodart￿ s (1993) research design does not permit separate identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of fees on utilization.
7In this sense, our paper relates to the economics of pricing in non-pro￿t industries in general (Newhouse, 1970;
Casper, 1979; Oster, 1995; Steinberg and Weisbrod, 1998; Oster, Gray, and Weinberg, 2003), and in social marketing
organizations in particular (Kotler and Roberto, 1989; Behrman, 1989).
8The determinants of product use also play an important role in many industrial organization contexts. For exam-
ple, utilization is of intrinsic public policy interest in the market for energy-intensive consumer durables (Hausman,
1979) and advertiser-supported media (Kalita and Duco⁄e, 1995; Petrin, 2003). Our methods may be useful in
identifying the relationship between pricing and utilization in such markets.
6we must leave to future work the question of how our conclusions generalize to more expensive
products. Indeed, since our original writing, Cohen and Dupas (2007) have applied a version of
our experimental design in the context of insecticide-treated mosquito nets, with some substantive
di⁄erences in conclusions. Finally, and most broadly, we focus here on two e⁄ects of pricing on use,
but others, such as quality signalling (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) and access to retail distribution
networks, may also play a role in determining optimal pricing policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background information
on our experimental setting. Section 3 lays out a formal model of Clorin use and discusses the
conditions needed for identi￿cation. Section 4 describes the design of our surveys and door-to-door
marketing experiment. Sections 5 and 6 present our ￿ndings on the e⁄ect of price changes on
product purchase and use. Section 7 describes a series of robustness checks on our key conditions.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Experimental Setting: Zambia, Safe Water, and Clorin
Clorin is a water puri￿cation solution that is marketed in Zambia by the Society for Family Health
(SFH), a local a¢ liate of Population Services International (PSI), an international non-pro￿t or-
ganization.9 Chemically, Clorin is sodium hypochlorite bleach, which can be mixed with water
stored in the household in order to kill water-borne pathogens, and thus prevent the contraction
of water-borne illnesses that are especially dangerous to young children. Because many households
in Zambia obtain their water from sources that are not properly chlorinated, and because Clorin is
less expensive than boiling water or other alternative methods of disinfection, it has been a popular
product since its launch in 1998 (Olembo et al, 2004).
Clorin is marketed by the bottle (see ￿gure 1), and a single bottle is su¢ cient to disinfect up
to 1,000 liters of water (about one month￿ s water supply for a family of six). Clorin is sold widely
in both retail outlets (for about 800-1,000 Kw) and health clinics (for about 500 Kw). These prices
are modest by Zambian standards; for comparison, in Lusaka, a week￿ s supply of cooking oil for a
family of six costs about 4,800 Kw.10 The fact that Clorin is a relatively inexpensive product limits
9See <http://www.psi.org/resources/pubs/clorin.html> for additional information.
10As of June 1, 2006, 800 Kw was equivalent to about $0.25 US. Average monthly urban household income in
Zambia in 2002-2003 was 790,652 Kw (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2006).
7the possibility that wealth e⁄ects contaminate our estimates (see also section 7).
In addition to the inherent importance of clean water for health in the developing world, we
chose to use Clorin in our study for two practical reasons. First, Clorin use can be measured not only
by household self-reports, but also by chemical tests for the presence of chlorine in stored drinking
water. These tests are themselves imperfect, because households￿source water (i.e., water from
taps) sometimes contain chlorine, and the levels of chlorination in source water vary considerably
across space and over time. Despite these drawbacks, the objectivity of chemical tests creates the
possibility of cross-validating households￿subjective reports.
Second, because Clorin has been widely marketed for several years, most households are familiar
with the product and with its prevailing retail price. In our baseline survey (described below), nearly
80 percent of respondents report having used Clorin at some point, and over 99 percent mention
Clorin when asked which water puri￿cation solutions they have heard of. Informal interviews and
focus groups further suggest high levels of awareness of Clorin prices. These facts, combined with
additional precautions described below, serve to minimize the information participants could have
gleaned from the prices we charged in our experiment. (We provide additional tests for informational
e⁄ects in section 7).
3 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we present a simple model of Clorin purchase and use, allowing for sunk-cost
e⁄ects using Eyster￿ s (2002) framework, in which households have a taste for rationalizing their
past actions. The model clari￿es the interpretation of our results and its dependence on our key
assumptions. At the end of the section, we discuss how our results would generalize to alternative
models of sunk-cost psychology.
3.1 Material Payo⁄s
We will consider household behavior in some number of periods indexed by t. In each period t,
each household i must decide whether to purchase Clorin and, if so, whether to use it in their
drinking water. In period t, each household i can decide to purchase Clorin for an exogenous,
possibly household-speci￿c o⁄er price pit 2 (0;R], where R > 0 is the retail price of Clorin. If the
8household decides to buy Clorin, it may receive an exogenous discount, so that it will only have to
pay the transaction price ~ pit 2 [0;pit]. We assume that households do not anticipate the possibility
of a discount, or, equivalently, that they consider the probability of a discount after purchase to be
negligible.
We experimentally manipulate the prices faced by households in a particular period t0. For
simplicity, we will assume that in all previous and subsequent periods, Clorin retails at R, and
there are no discounts. That is, we assume that, in any period t 6= t0, pit = ~ pit = R. In period
t0, however, prices pit0 and ~ pit0 are randomly assigned across households in a manner speci￿ed in
section 4 below. We will also assume for simplicity that the utility from using Clorin in a given
period is independent of its use in previous or future periods.11
We will think of a period as approximately one month, about the time it takes to use up a
bottle of Clorin in drinking water for a family of six. We assume that Clorin cannot be stored
across periods. Chemically, Clorin is storable, but in practice the vast majority of households in
our sample appear to have exhausted the Clorin we sold them within the six weeks of our follow-
up period. This suggests that it is reasonable to focus on within-period use. Implicitly, we are
thereby assuming that if a household buys Clorin in some period and does not use it in drinking
water, it is exhausted in some other way. Field interviews we conducted after our study suggest
a plausible account is that households use Clorin to undertake household chores such as bleaching
sheets, washing vegetables, and cleaning toilets (see section 4.5).12
In each period, each household makes two decisions. First, the household must decide whether
to buy Clorin. Then, if the household has purchased Clorin, it must decide whether to use Clorin
in its drinking water. We let bit 2 f0;1g be an indicator for whether household i buys Clorin
in period t. We let dit 2 f0;1g denote whether household i puts Clorin in its drinking water in
11Together, these assumptions mean that when we consider the e⁄ect of an increase in the o⁄er price pit0, we ignore
cross-channel substitution (households buying from our door-to-door marketers who would otherwise have bought
in a store) and intertemporal substitution (households buying from us who would otherwise have bought at a later
time). The demand elasticities we estimate in our experiment are therefore unlikely to generalize (quantitatively) to
a permanent, market-wide change in the retail price R.
12If our data are misleading, and in fact many households store and defer use of Clorin in drinking water, this force
would reduce the power of our experimental tests to detect sunk-cost e⁄ects. In the model below, sunk-cost e⁄ects
arise because households view it as a mistake to have purchased Clorin when they do not use it in their drinking
water. In a model with storability, sunk-cost e⁄ects of the sort we test for would instead require that households view
it as a mistake to have purchased Clorin when they do not use it in their drinking water in the period immediately
following purchase.
9period t, with dit = 0 whenever bit = 0. We assume these decisions are made sequentially, so that
the decision to purchase is ￿xed when the household chooses whether to use Clorin in its drinking
water. Consistent with the discussion above, we can think of dit = 0 as performing household
chores (other than purifying drinking water), which, as seems reasonable, we assume is possible
with or without Clorin.
To apply Eyster￿ s (2002) framework, we need to specify both material payo⁄s and utility, the
latter incorporating the psychological desire to rationalize past choices. We begin by specifying the
material payo⁄ function, which we normalize so that the payo⁄ from not buying Clorin is 0:
Households di⁄er in the bene￿ts and costs of using Clorin in their drinking water. We will write
the net material payo⁄ (in Kwacha) to household i from buying Clorin and using it in its drinking
water in period t as vi + "it ￿ ~ pit: Here, vi captures factors that are constant over time for a given
household and are known at the time of purchase, and "it captures time-varying shocks unknown
at the time of purchase.
Formally, we assume that vi is distributed i.i.d. across households, that "it is distributed i.i.d
across households and time periods, and that vi and "it are independent of one another and of
o⁄er and transaction prices pit and ~ pit (the last condition being maintained by experimental ran-
domization). Consistent with the interpretation of "it as an unanticipated shock, we will normalize
E ("it) = 0. To simplify exposition, we assume that both vi and "it are distributed according to
(possibly di⁄erent) di⁄erentiable CDFs with full support on the real line, and that vi has ￿nite
mean.
The terms vi and "it are general enough to accommodate a range of factors. For example, Clorin
is used when the household obtains water from its local source, and hence its use requires attention
from the female head of household at that time. In some households, the female head may have
many other chores to complete when obtaining water, making it hard to put Clorin in at the right
time (low vi), whereas in others the female head may have few other responsibilities coincident
with obtaining water (high vi). In addition, for a given household, variation in the household￿ s
day-to-day needs may lead to higher (low "it) or lower (high "it) demands on the female head￿ s
attention when she obtains water, a⁄ecting the incentive to use Clorin.13
13Many other interpretations are possible. For example, households may di⁄er in their general level of concern
about water-borne illness, inducing variation in vi. After purchase, some households may hear about an especially
10To complete the speci￿cation of payo⁄s we must specify the payo⁄ to buying Clorin and then
not using it in drinking water, using it instead for household cleaning. In that case, the bene￿t
of Clorin is the market value of the standard household cleaners whose use is o⁄set by Clorin.
That interpretation suggests a small return from using Clorin for non-drinking-water purposes. For
example, data from a 2006 survey of retail prices show that the sodium hypochlorite in a bottle
of Clorin can be obtained from Jik, a more concentrated household bleach, for about 300 Kw.14
Moreover, our ￿eld experience suggests that households ￿nd products like Jik to be more e⁄ective
cleaners, suggesting that 300 Kw of Jik may deliver even more than one Clorin bottle￿ s worth
of cleaning power. Given the small bene￿t to Clorin not used in drinking water, we assume for
simplicity that the material payo⁄ to buying Clorin and not using it in drinking water is ￿~ pit,
implying that no household would buy Clorin if it were not possible to use it in drinking water.
Although that assumption is extreme and unlikely to hold exactly for all households, it seems likely
to be a reasonable approximation on average, based both on the calculations above and on our
conversations with female heads of household.15
To summarize, we can specify an (ex-post) material payo⁄ function u(bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) that
relates choices to payo⁄s as a function of household characteristics and the transaction price:
u(0;0; ~ pit;vi;"it) = 0
u(1;0; ~ pit;vi;"it) = ￿~ pit
u(1;1; ~ pit;vi;"it) = vi + "it ￿ ~ pit:
(Recall that dit = 0 whenever bit = 0, so u(0;1; ~ pit;vi;"it) is unde￿ned.)
bad local incident of child diarrhea, leading to a high "it. Or they may hear that diarrhea episodes have been rare
recently, leading to a low "it.
14As of the 2006 retailer survey, a 750ml container of Jik, consisting of 3.5% sodium hypochlorite, retailed for a
median of 7,000 Kw. A 250ml bottle of Clorin, consisting of 0.5% sodium hypochlorite, retailed for a median of 800
Kw. The amount of sodium hypochlorite in a container of Jik is therefore equivalent to the amount found in about
21 bottles of Clorin, so 333 Kw of Jik buys as much sodium hypochlorite as one bottle (800 Kw) of Clorin. Note
that this calculation ignores the convenience of Clorin￿ s smaller size (and hence lower price per sales unit). Recall,
however, that a week￿ s supply of cooking oil for a household costs about 4,800 Kw, suggesting that 7,000 Kw is not
a prohibitive outlay.
15If the assumption were to fail, then the sunk-cost e⁄ects we derive below would operate only over the range of
transaction prices ~ pit above the cost savings from using Clorin as a household cleaner.
113.2 Utility and Regret
To allow for psychological e⁄ects of prices, we will suppose that households have a taste for con-
sistency, i.e. for taking actions in the present that rationalize their past choices. Following Eyster
(2002), we implement this assumption by positing that realized household utility U (bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it)
depends both on ex-post material payo⁄ and on a regret function:
U (bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) ￿ u(bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) ￿ ￿r(bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) (1)
where r() denotes regret and ￿ ￿ 0 indexes the importance of regret in the household￿ s utility
function.
We refer the reader to Eyster (2002) for a more careful exposition of the regret function. For-
mally, it is de￿ned as follows
r(bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) ￿ u
￿
~ b(dit; ~ pit;vi;"it);dit; ~ pit;vi;"it
￿
￿ u(bit;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) (2)
where
~ b(dit; ~ pit;vi;"it) ￿ argmax
b
fu(b;dit; ~ pit;vi;"it)g:
Informally, given an action pair, regret is how much better the household￿ s material payo⁄ would
be if it could re-choose its ￿rst stage action taking its second stage action, and the realization of
"it, as given.16 Households prefer to avoid regret, i.e. to choose actions that limit the harm done
by their past choices given their current ones.
The de￿nition in (2) implies that
r(0;0; ~ pit;vi;"it) = 0 (3)
r(1;0; ~ pit;vi;"it) = ~ pit
r(1;1; ~ pit;vi;"it) = 0:
16Note that, as we have de￿ned it, regret depends on the realized transaction price ~ pit, which is technically not
observed by non-purchasing households. However, because non-purchasing households do not make a use decision,
and because households are unaware of the possibility of a discount at the time of purchase, this is purely a notational
simpli￿cation, with no implications for behavior.
12That is, regret is experienced only when the household buys Clorin but does not use it in its
drinking water, and is felt in proportion to the amount spent on Clorin.
In the model, then, if a household knew for sure that it would not use Clorin to purify its drinking
water, it would not buy Clorin. Households buy Clorin because they may use it in drinking water,
but if circumstances are such that Clorin is not used in drinking water, the household regrets its
purchase, and the regret experienced is greater the more the household paid for Clorin. Households
may therefore be willing to use Clorin in drinking water to avoid regret, i.e. to rationalize the past
decision to buy.
3.3 Choice and Identi￿cation
We can now specify how the household chooses whether to purchase Clorin and, if so, whether to
use it in drinking water. Beginning with the use decision, if the household has purchased Clorin,
the use decision is given by d￿
it (~ pit;vi;"it), where
d￿
it (~ pit;vi;"it) ￿ argmax
d
U (1;d; ~ pit;vi;"it):
This, in turn, implies that
d￿
it (~ pit;vi;"it) = 1
()
vi + "it ￿ ￿￿~ pit:
That is, the household will use Clorin in its drinking water if the net bene￿t of doing so exceeds
the regret associated with not doing so. (Note that we have assumed for simplicity that ties are
broken in favor of use.)
When households are deciding whether to purchase Clorin in the ￿rst place, they do not an-
ticipate the discount, and do not know the realization of the time-varying shock "it. Therefore we
write the expected-utility-maximizing purchase decision as b￿
it (pit;vi), with
b￿




13where the expectation is taken over the distribution of the shocks "it. It follows that
b￿
it (pit;vi) = 1
()
E [max(vi + "it;￿￿pit) j vi;pit] ￿ pit
where we adopt the arbitrary rule that ties are broken in favor of purchasing.
Note that the household conditions its decision on the (known) household-speci￿c bene￿t para-
meter vi and on the o⁄er price pit. In particular, there exists a real-valued cuto⁄ v￿ (pit), strictly
increasing in pit, such that the household purchases if and only if vi ￿ v￿ (pit). The proof of this
result is straightforward; economically, it follows from the fact that a higher vi increases the antic-
ipated bene￿t from buying Clorin and a higher pi increases the anticipated cost (both ￿nancially
and psychologically).
Empirically, we do not observe the choice functions b￿
it (pit;vi) and d￿
it (~ pit;vi;"it), but rather
the empirical frequencies of di⁄erent choices as a function of the prices pit and ~ pit. To develop the
model￿ s empirical predictions, then, it will be helpful to write out these probabilities:
Pr(b￿
it (pit;vi) = 1 j pit; ~ pit) = Pr(vi ￿ v￿ (pit))
Pr(d￿
it (~ pit;vi;"it) = 1 j pit; ~ pit) = Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿~ pit j vi ￿ v￿ (pit))
where the second probability conditions on the decision to purchase Clorin.
In a non-experimental period t 6= t0, pit = ~ pit = R, so there is no price variation and hence no
comparative statics to test. (The model does imply restrictions on the relationship between prices
in the experimental period and use in non-experimental period, which we explore in appendix A.)
In the experimental period t0, by contrast, the above equations have two important empirical
implications about the relationship between prices and use.17
￿ The ￿rst, which we call the screening e⁄ect, is that, conditional on purchase, the probability
17A third, more obvious, implication is that the greater is the price of Clorin, the fewer households will purchase
it. Note that this result comes both from the traditional substitution e⁄ect, and from the fact that a higher price
implies greater anticipated regret in the case in which Clorin is not used in drinking water.
14of use is higher the greater is pit0. This is because a higher pit0 imposes a stricter (higher)
cuto⁄ v￿ (pit0) on anticipated bene￿ts for buyers.
￿ The second, which we call the sunk-cost e⁄ect, is that, conditional on purchase, the probability
of use is increasing in the transaction price ~ pit0 whenever ￿ > 0. This is because a greater
transaction price implies a greater desire to rationalize the purchase decision (or, equivalently,
greater regret from not using Clorin in drinking water).
Observe that these two e⁄ects cannot be distinguished if transaction prices cannot vary indepen-
dently of o⁄er prices. If pit0 = ~ pit0 for all i in some period t, then a ￿nding that higher prices causes
more drinking water use conditional on purchase would be consistent with the presence of either
the sunk-cost e⁄ect (￿ > 0) or the screening e⁄ect (heterogeneity in vi), or both.18 Hence, the
two-stage pricing design solves an identi￿cation problem that would be present in data with only
a single price, even if that price were suitably exogenous.
It is worth noting that, although Eyster￿ s model is the most fully articulated single-agent theory
of sunk-cost e⁄ects of which we are aware, reasonable alternatives exist with possibly di⁄erent
empirical implications. For example, if sunk-cost e⁄ects were driven by a desire to justify the ex
ante wisdom of one￿ s decision, rather than ex post wisdom of one￿ s decision as in Eyster￿ s framework,
it is possible that the o⁄er price, rather than the transaction price, would in￿ uence use behavior.19
Such e⁄ects would confound our tests.20 On the other hand, Thaler￿ s (1980) prospect-theoretic
justi￿cation for sunk-cost e⁄ects hinges on a desire to avoid a feeling of loss experienced when one
18Note that the psychology of regret is also relevant for the magnitude of the screening e⁄ect, as the parameter ￿
partially determines the degree of price sensitivity in the purchase decision.
19Sunk-cost e⁄ects could also operate through a desire to justify the purchase to another member of the household,
rather than to oneself (Prendergast and Stole, 1996). In that case, whether the o⁄er or transaction price would in￿ u-
ence use behavior through the sunk-cost mechanism would depend on the informational conditions in the household.
Because only the o⁄er price is known to the buyer at the time of the purchase decision, a fully informed household
member would judge the intelligence of the decision based on the o⁄er price. However, because only the transaction
price is actually implemented, it may be more observable to other members of the household than the o⁄er price. In
that case, higher transaction prices would lead to greater use due to a desire to justify the purchase decision to other
household members, so our tests for sunk-cost e⁄ects would be valid.
20Another possible confound arises if use depends not on the transaction price itself but on the discount, i.e. the
di⁄erence between the o⁄er and transaction prices. We ￿nd no evidence in our data of a relationship between use
and the relative size of the discount￿ that is, the di⁄erence between o⁄er and transaction prices, divided by the o⁄er
price. If instead psychological e⁄ects operate through the absolute (as opposed to relative) size of the discount (o⁄er
price minus transaction price), the resulting model is collinear with those we estimate, and is therefore not identi￿ed.
If the e⁄ect of a greater discount is to increase use, then our estimates will tend to overstate the screening e⁄ect
and to understate the sunk-cost e⁄ect. If greater discounts tend to decrease use, our estimates will understate the
screening e⁄ect and overstate the sunk-cost e⁄ect.
15does not realize consumption gains from a past purchase. In such a model transaction prices likely
would mediate the e⁄ect, suggesting that our tests may be valid under mechanisms other than the
one we model explicitly.
4 Experimental and Survey Design
Our main study consisted of a baseline survey, a randomized door-to-door marketing intervention
approximately two weeks later, and a follow-up survey approximately two weeks after the interven-
tion. We also conducted a second, longer-term follow-up survey, and a small-scale interview study
(on a di⁄erent sample) to assess non-drinking-water uses of Clorin.21
4.1 Baseline Survey Procedures and Sample Selection
We ￿elded our baseline survey to 1;260 households in Lusaka, Zambia in May, 2006. To select house-
holds, we ￿rst selected ￿ve low-income peri-urban areas (￿compounds￿ ).22 Because we wanted to
sample a population whose water source had limited chlorination (to maximize the health bene￿ts
of Clorin), we avoided compounds close to the main water line in Lusaka. We also avoided com-
pounds where we knew that NGOs were (or had recently been) distributing Clorin for free from
door to door. Our interviews focused on female heads of household, because prior experience (later
con￿rmed by our baseline data) suggested that they play a central role in decision-making about
purchases of Clorin, and are typically the household members responsible for putting Clorin in
the water.23 To minimize our in￿ uence on participants￿behavior, our baseline survey instrument
informed participants that we might return for a follow-up interview, but it did not specify the
time or nature of that interview, nor did it state that such an interview was certain to occur.
The survey interview was divided into several sections. First, we asked for a variety of basic
demographic information, such as age, marital status, schooling levels, fertility history, household
composition, and ownership of various durable goods (as a proxy for wealth or income). We then
21Our three survey instruments, and our marketing script, are available as a supplemental appendix to this paper.
22Within the ￿ve compounds we chose, we sampled 10 randomly chosen standard enumeration areas (SEAs) for
surveying. Within each SEA, we sampled one out of every ￿ve households until the target of 252 households was
reached for the compound.
23At each household, the surveyor asked to speak with the female head of household, and if there was no one home
or the female head was unavailable, the surveyor returned later that day to complete the survey. If the female head
of household could not be reached on that day, the house was skipped.
16asked a range of questions about media exposure, malaria knowledge, and behaviors related to
malaria prevention. These questions served to make the purpose of our study less transparent to
the interviewee. Finally, we asked several sets of questions related to water use practices, diarrhea,
soap use, attitudes toward and use of water puri￿cation techniques, access to water sources, and
detailed questions on the use of Clorin.
Appendix table 1 compares average demographic characteristics of the households in our base-
line sample to Lusaka residents sampled in the 2001 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of
Zambia.24 The characteristics are broadly comparable between the two samples. Because we in-
terviewed the female head of household, our respondents tend to be slightly older and more likely
to be married than the DHS respondents. The households in our baseline sample also have slightly
lower levels of durables ownership than those in the DHS data, probably because of our insistence
on sampling low-income compounds without access to the main Lusaka water line.
4.2 Measuring Clorin Use and Water Chlorination
Our primary survey measure of Clorin use is the household￿ s (yes or no) response to whether its
stored drinking water is currently treated with Clorin. We complement this subjective measure
with an objective estimate of the chemical concentration of chlorine in the household￿ s drinking
water. In the last part of the interview, the surveyor put a small amount of household drinking
water (usually stored in a large plastic jug) into a Styrofoam cup, and inserted a chemical test
strip into the cup. After exposure to water, areas of the test strip change color based on chlorine
concentrations in the water. We used the Sensafe Waterworks 2 test strip,25 which tests for both
free chlorine radicals (chlorine available to kill pathogens) and total chlorine (free chlorine plus
chloramines, a by-product of chlorine combining with organic compounds).26 We focus on free
chlorine, because our own experimentation, as well as conversations with the manufacturer, suggest
that the free chlorine measurement is more reliable and less sensitive to variation in test conditions
24We are grateful to Emily Oster for providing tabulations of demographic characteristics from the DHS. See
<http://www.measuredhs.com/> for further details on the survey.
25The Sensafe Waterworks 2 test strip is Industrial Test Systems part number 480655. See
<http://www.sensafe.com/> for corporate information and <http://www.sensafe.com/480655.php> for additional
information about the test strip.
26See chapters 13 and 14 of Hauser (2002) for more information on chlorine chemistry and chlorine testing.
17(such as light and heat) than measurement of total chlorine.27 The test strip identi￿es seven possible
concentrations of free chlorine: 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2.5, and 5 parts per million.28
It is worth noting that chlorination and Clorin use in drinking water are not identical concepts,
even though they are closely related. A household could have chlorine in its water without using
Clorin: water from some taps is (often inconsistently) chlorinated. And, if a household￿ s drinking
water is highly contaminated to start out, then it is possible to use a low dose of Clorin without
leaving any detectable free chlorine residual in the water. Nevertheless, as expected, measured
chlorination is highly related to self-reported use of Clorin, and a Pearson ￿2 test de￿nitively
rejects the independence of the two distributions (p ￿ value < 0:001). Among the 21 percent of
households that report that their water is currently treated with Clorin, more than 60 percent
have at least some free chlorine, whereas this ￿gure is below 40 percent for the households that
report that their water is not currently treated with Clorin. Indeed, levels of free chlorine of 2:5
and 5 parts per million are only found in households that report that their water is treated with
Clorin. In order to limit sensitivity to these rare outliers, we follow Parker et al. (2006) in using in
our analysis a binary measure of the presence of free chlorine (free chlorine levels of 0:1 parts per
million or greater).29 In the baseline survey, 41 percent of the households have at least 0:1 parts
per million of free chlorine in their water.
4.3 Door-to-Door Marketing Experiment
For our marketing experiment, we sent a team of six marketers out in May and June of 2006 to
the 1;260 households from the baseline survey.30 The marketing was designed to occur about two
weeks after the household was surveyed for the baseline, but actual lag times varied due to variation
in logistical factors such as the di¢ culty of contacting the original survey respondents.31
27Using total chlorine in place of free chlorine in our analysis results in stronger evidence of a screening e⁄ect and
no evidence of a sunk-cost e⁄ect.
28For reference, U.S. drinking water guidelines typically call for a minimum free chlorine residual
of 0:2 parts per million and a maximum total chlorine concentration of 4 parts per million. (See
<http://www.epa.gov/safewater/mcl.html>, <http://www.nps.gov/public_health/inter/faqs/faq_dw.htm#3>.)
Note, however, that smaller amounts of free chlorine residual still a⁄ord some protection against contamination.
29Our substantive conclusions are unchanged (estimates are identical in direction and statistical signi￿cance) when
we instead estimate ordered probit models using the level of free chlorine as the dependent variable. See appendix B
for details.
30Marketers were paid on a ￿xed rate per day worked.
31If the marketers found a house but there was no one home, they returned at least three times on two di⁄erent
days to try to contact the original respondent. If someone was home but it was not the female head of household
18After making contact with the female head of household, the marketers followed a written
script.32 The marketer o⁄ered to sell a single bottle of Clorin for a one-time-only price. This
initial o⁄er price was chosen randomly, with 10 percent of households receiving an o⁄er price of
800 Zambian Kwacha (Kw), and the remaining 90 percent split as evenly as possible among o⁄er
prices of 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 Kw. (See table 1 for exact proportions.) The marketing
script for each household speci￿ed the initial o⁄er price to be charged, allowing us to control the
randomization directly, and ensuring that the marketers had no discretion in setting this price.
If the respondent agreed to buy at the initial o⁄er price, the marketer informed her that she
might be eligible for an additional discount.33 The respondent was given a sealed envelope, which
contained a coupon o⁄ering a one-time discounted price on the bottle of Clorin.34 Using a sealed
envelope allowed us to control the amount of the discount, and to prevent the marketer from
signaling the discount using body language or other cues.35 After the respondent opened the
envelope, the respondent paid for the bottle of Clorin, wrote the amount of the transaction price
on a receipt, and signed it.36 After that, the marketing session ended.
To make the transaction price as psychologically salient as possible, marketers were trained to
o⁄er the discount before the respondents went to retrieve the cash payment, so that the respondents
would count out only the amount of money needed to pay the transaction price. Showing the amount
of the transaction price on the face of the coupon (see appendix ￿gure 1) and requiring participants
to write the transaction price on a receipt also served this purpose. We expected these measures
named in the baseline survey, they made an appointment to return when the female head would be home.
32In principle, marketers￿tone or body language could have di⁄ered with the o⁄er price, confounding our estimates
of treatment e⁄ects. During training exercises, and during a small number of supervised transactions, we observed
no indications of variation in body language or tone related to o⁄er prices. Marketers commonly did not look at the
o⁄er price before beginning the script. All our key results are robust to marketer ￿xed e⁄ects, and our data show no
evidence of di⁄erential treatment e⁄ects by marketer (see appendix B).
33If the respondent agreed to buy at the initial o⁄er price, but did not have the necessary cash on hand, the
marketer o⁄ered to reschedule, and returned to complete the script at the arranged date and time. Our ￿ndings are
robust to excluding households that requested a return visit due to a lack of cash on hand.
34None of the participants who were prepared to pay the initial o⁄er price subsequently refused to buy at the
discounted transaction price.
35As we report in section 7, conditional on the o⁄er price we ￿nd no evidence that household purchase decisions
were related to the transaction price, consistent with the intent of our design.
36Use of a receipt allowed us to check that the marketers had complied with the instructions, and provided an
additional incentive for them to do so. Hand-checking of these receipts con￿rmed that di⁄erent receipts from the
same marketer were in di⁄erent handwriting, providing further evidence of the integrity of the marketing process. In
four cases, the marketer transacted at a price other than the one we speci￿ed due to human error, and in one case the
o⁄er price was incorrect. In these cases, we will use the intended prices rather than the actual prices for the purposes
of our analysis, to ensure that these errors do not contaminate our ￿ndings. We note, however, that this choice does
not meaningfully a⁄ect our results.
19to maximize the power of our tests for sunk-cost e⁄ects.37
To minimize inference about the market price of Clorin based the o⁄er and transaction prices,
the marketing script explicitly told respondents that Clorin was available in retail outlets for around
800 Kw.38 To minimize inference about the quality of the Clorin bottles on o⁄er, marketers intro-
duced themselves as o¢ cial representatives of SFH, the highly credible organization that produces,
distributes, and markets Clorin throughout Zambia.39
We also took steps to make the two-price structure seem as natural as possible. When asked
why they were o⁄ering Clorin at lower-than-normal prices, marketers explained that the price was
part of a special promotion. They used the same explanation to account for the additional discount
after the asking price was agreed upon. Door-to-door sales (and giveaways) are not unheard of
for products like Clorin, and participants seemed to accept this explanation. After we explained
that the initial o⁄er price was a promotional price, participants rarely questioned the reason for
the discounted transaction price.
The size of the discount was chosen randomly, but every household received a discount of at
least 100 Kw. We o⁄ered a discount to every household to avoid disappointing the respondents,
and to ensure that every household was exposed to the coupon (in case of any advertising e⁄ects
of the coupon itself).40 Because we hypothesized that paying even a small amount might be very
di⁄erent psychologically than paying nothing, we randomized the discounts so that, regardless of
the o⁄er price, 40 percent of households received a 100% discount, and thus had a transaction price
of zero. For each o⁄er price, we split the remaining 60 percent of households evenly among the set
of transaction prices that were above zero but at least 100 Kw below the o⁄er price. (See table 1
for details.) So, for example, among households that were o⁄ered Clorin for 700 Kw, 40 percent
37Some evidence indicates that we succeeded in making the transaction price salient. In the follow-up survey,
respondents were asked whether anyone had o⁄ered them Clorin for free in the last month. Among households that,
according to our records, received a free bottle (zero transaction price), some 60 percent report having received a
bottle for free, as against only 16 percent among those who did not receive a free bottle (transaction price above 0).
The di⁄erence between these two groups is highly statistically signi￿cant, and the presence of some positive responses
among those paying for Clorin seems plausibly attributable to recall error. We did not ask respondents to recall the
amount of the transaction price if they paid a positive price.
38Early pilot interviews suggested that most people in Lusaka are well aware of these prices.
39Because surveyors introduced themselves as carrying out a health survey for a researcher at Harvard University,
having marketers identify themselves as representatives of SFH also provides greater con￿dence that behavior in
response to the marketing intervention is not driven by the belief that the experimental participants are ￿being
watched￿(Levitt and List, 2007).
40This design choice represents a potentially important departure from Arkes and Blumer￿ s (1985) design, in which
identi￿cation of sunk-cost e⁄ects relies in part on comparing those who received a discount to those who did not.
20were assigned a transaction price of 0 (a discount of 700 Kw), and 10 percent were assigned to a
transaction price of 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, and 600 Kw (discounts of 600, 500, 400, 300, 200, and
100 Kw, respectively).
We assigned the o⁄er and transaction prices randomly prior to the marketing outings, so that
every household was assigned an o⁄er price and a transaction price, even if we were unable to
reach the household during marketing. The randomization was fully strati￿ed by compound, with
every compound receiving (up to integer constraints) the exact same mix of o⁄er and transaction
prices.41 At the time of randomization we used an F-test to verify that observable characteristics
were balanced across treatments, and, in a few cases, re-randomized when this was not the case.42
Appendix table 2 presents regressions of treatment conditions on a range of household char-
acteristics measured in the baseline survey, with speci￿cations that parallel our analysis of price
e⁄ects. In all cases, an F-test of the restriction that all covariates enter with a coe¢ cient of zero
fails to reject at any conventional signi￿cance level, and the coe¢ cients are generally individu-
ally statistically insigni￿cant. Two exceptions are worth noting. First, among households reached
during marketing, baseline self-reported Clorin use is almost marginally statistically signi￿cantly
related to the o⁄er price (p = 0:103). Second, among those who purchased Clorin in the marketing
phase, there is a statistically signi￿cant relationship between the transaction price and the chemical
presence of free chlorine in the baseline (p = 0:020), although the relationship with self-reported use
is insigni￿cant and has the opposite sign.43 (A dummy for whether the household paid a positive
transaction price is positively but not statistically signi￿cantly related to either self-reported Clorin
use or measured chlorination.) Our key results are fully robust to controls for baseline use.
41We made an e⁄ort to reach all sampled households in a given compound within a short period, so as to minimize
communication between households about the price randomization. Debrie￿ng interviews after a pilot experiment
suggest that communication about the discounts was rare. As a further check on possible social e⁄ects of our price
manipulations, we have veri￿ed that a household￿ s purchase and use decisions are uncorrelated with the o⁄er and
transaction prices assigned to the closest neighboring household (results not shown).
42We conducted these balancing tests, separately by compound, on the sample of households surveyed in the
baseline. We could not conduct analogous tests for the balance of transaction prices on the sample of households
buying Clorin from us in the marketing phase, because we could not predict which households would be reached for
our marketing intervention, or which households would purchase Clorin.
43In the full sample, using soap after using the toilet (self-reported) is marginally statistically signi￿cantly negatively
related to the o⁄er price (p = 0:054). Among buyers, an indicator for the female head of household having attended
school is marginally statistically signi￿cantly positively related to the positive price condition (p = 0:083), though our
measure of years of schooling is marginally signi￿cantly negatively related to the positive price condition (p = 0:087),
suggesting no consistently signed relationship with schooling levels.
214.4 Follow-up Survey
For our follow-up survey, we sent the original survey teams to ￿nd and re-interview the households
that we successfully reached for the marketing intervention.44 We re-interviewed households ap-
proximately two weeks after the marketing intervention, but actual lags varied due to logistical
factors.45 We chose the timing of this survey to fall in the middle of the period during which
households would be using the bottle of Clorin we sold them.
The follow-up interview consisted of several sections. First, we repeated a handful of demo-
graphic questions from the baseline survey, as a check on the identity of the respondents.46 Next,
we asked a variety of questions about health knowledge and attitudes, and hygiene practices. We
then asked a detailed set of questions about the household￿ s use of Clorin, followed by questions
about whether the household had been visited by marketers at any point in the past. This question
served as an additional check on whether we had reached the correct household. After concluding
the questions on Clorin use, we tested the household￿ s water, following the same procedure as in
the baseline survey. Finally, once we had concluded measurement of Clorin use and chlorination,
we asked several questions relating to sunk-cost psychology. We asked these questions at the end of
the survey because we did not want households￿answers to these questions to a⁄ect their responses
about Clorin use.
We reached 890 households in the follow-up survey (out of the 1;004 households that were
successfully reached during the marketing phase). Appendix table 3 presents some evidence on the
determinants of attrition. In the marketing phase, we were more successful in reaching households
that owned a larger share of the set of durables goods (car, radio, television) that we asked about,
44Because they were not exposed to our marketing experiment, we did not attempt to interview the households
that we did not reach during the door-to-door marketing. Note, however, that we interviewed households reached in
our marketing intervention whether or not they purchased Clorin from our marketing team.
45If the surveyors found a house but there was no one home, they returned at least three times to contact the
original respondent. If someone was home but it was not the female head of household named in the baseline survey,
they made an appointment to return when the female head would be home. In cases where it proved exceedingly
di¢ cult to reach the female head of household, the surveyor accepted another female adult household member as
an interviewee, and noted this adjustment in the questionnaire. This occurred in 58 cases, and our ￿ndings are not
substantively di⁄erent when we restrict attention to the cases in which we successfully reinterviewed the original
respondent.
46Among the cases in which our records indicate that we successfully reinterviewed the original respondent, these
demographic characteristics are strongly correlated between the baseline and follow-up surveys, with (highly statis-
tically signi￿cant) correlation coe¢ cients of 0:94 - 0:97. (The demographic characteristics are inconsistent between
the baseline and follow-up surveys in 8 percent of cases.)
22most likely because wealthier households tended to be in more developed sections of the compounds
and were therefore easier to locate.47 In the follow-up survey, attrition was still related to observ-
ables, though less so than in the marketing phase. Most importantly, at neither stage is the o⁄er
or transaction price related to the likelihood of attrition. This provides some reason to believe
that our experimental results are not confounded by di⁄erential sample selection across treatment
conditions.
4.5 Additional Survey Data
We will test for screening and sunk-cost e⁄ects by relating use measured at follow-up to o⁄er and
transaction prices. In order for this to constitute a valid test of the model, the follow-up period must
correspond to the experimental period t0. This means that the Clorin we sold during the marketing
intervention was in use at the time of the follow-up. To check this, we asked our surveyors at
follow-up to identify the bottles of Clorin we had sold, which we had marked on the bottom with
an ￿X.￿In nearly 80 percent of the cases in which our records indicate that the household purchased
Clorin, the surveyors were able to identify the marked bottle among the household￿ s inventory of
Clorin bottles. Among households in which the surveyors identi￿ed the bottle we sold, in the vast
majority of cases (nearly 80 percent) the bottle was partly, but not completely, full. In addition
to con￿rming our expectations regarding the rate of exhaustion of Clorin, this evidence serves to
mitigate concerns about inter-household transfer or resale of bottles.48
The model also assumes that Clorin not used in drinking water is used in some other way, rather
than being stored for later use. We can bring some evidence to bear on this issue. We ￿elded a
second follow-up survey so that, if we did ￿nd evidence of sunk-cost e⁄ects, we would be able to
study whether they persisted after households had exhausted the bottle we sold them. Interviews
occurred approximately six weeks after the marketing intervention, although actual lags varied due
to logistical factors.49 Consistent with the model￿ s assumptions, surveyor inventories conducted at
47Wealthier households were also more likely to have address plates on their homes (rather than having their
address written on the door or outside walls), which helped the survey team to locate the address. Households in the
￿fth locality we surveyed were also signi￿cantly more likely to be reached, probably because that compound had a
more organized system of household addresses than the other compounds.
48In the short survey we describe below, only 6 percent of households report ever giving Clorin away.
49We used a survey instrument similar to that from the ￿rst follow-up. We successfully contacted approximately
80 percent of households for the second follow-up, signi￿cantly lower than the 89 percent recontact rate from the
￿rst follow-up. (As in the ￿rst follow-up, we attempted to contact only those households that had been successfully
23second follow-up showed that in over 80 percent of households the bottle we sold was either absent
(76 percent of households) or empty (6 percent).
In our discussion of the model, we interpret a household that buys Clorin and does not use
Clorin in its drinking water as having used Clorin for household chores. For additional evidence
on the plausibility of this assumption, we turn to evidence from a series of in-depth interviews
we conducted on a convenience sample of 49 Clorin-using female heads of household from four
compounds in Lusaka, over six days in January and February 2008.50 From pilot interviews we
identi￿ed a set of chores in which Clorin was sometimes used. For each chore, an interviewer
discussed with the respondent how she did the chore and whether she used Clorin at any point.
If the respondent indicated that she used Clorin in doing the chore, the interviewer asked her to
demonstrate how much Clorin she used (with a Clorin bottle ￿lled with water). The interviewer then
measured the amount with a measuring cup. Interviewees report substantial non-drinking water use
of Clorin. Some 61 percent of households report using Clorin for purposes other than drinking water
puri￿cation (96 percent report using it in drinking water). The most common reported alternative
use was washing clothes, followed by cleaning toilets. According to our measurement exercise, these
uses often involve substantial amounts of Clorin. Accounting for the relative frequency of di⁄erent
types of uses, we estimate that, among the respondents we interviewed, the average household
devotes 38 percent of Clorin by volume to non-drinking-water uses.51 This ￿nding suggests that
our interpretation of non-drinking-water use as use in household chores is at least quantitatively
plausible.
5 Evidence on Screening E⁄ects
In this section, we test for a screening e⁄ect: namely, that the higher is the o⁄er price, the greater
is the propensity to use Clorin in drinking water among those who buy. The model predicts such
contacted during the marketing intervention.)
50Interviewers collected data on age and years of schooling to test comparability with ever-users of Clorin in our
baseline survey. Means of the two variables are broadly comparable between the two samples, with the interview
survey sample somewhat more educated than the baseline sample. We are grateful to Michael Kremer for suggesting
that we conduct these interviews to learn more about alternative uses of Clorin.
51In our original follow-up survey, about one-￿fth of households report using Clorin for non-drinking-water purposes,
substantially below the ￿gure we found in our interviews. A plausible account of the discrepancy is that we took
greater care in the in-depth interviews to list comprehensively the chores in which Clorin might be used.
24e⁄ects because households have information about their likelihood of using Clorin in drinking water,
and they use this information in making their purchase decisions. Hence, households that are less
likely to use Clorin in drinking water are willing to pay less to buy it, and are therefore less common
in the pool of buyers the greater is the o⁄er price.
A prerequisite for such an e⁄ect is that o⁄er prices a⁄ect purchasing behavior. Figure 2 shows
the e⁄ect of o⁄er price on the propensity to buy Clorin during our door-to-door intervention. The
￿gure shows a downward-sloping relationship between o⁄er price and the share purchasing Clorin,
with nearly 80 percent of respondents buying Clorin at 300 Kw and only about 50 percent buying
at 800 Kw. Column (1) of table 2 presents an estimate of a linear probability model of demand
as a function of the o⁄er price.52 The model implies that an increase of 100 Kw in the o⁄er price
would result in a (highly statistically signi￿cant) 7 percentage point reduction in the probability
of purchase, corresponding to an economically nontrivial price elasticity (evaluated at the mean
o⁄er price and purchase probability) of about ￿0:6.53 Columns (2) and (3) of table 2 show that
the results in column (1) are robust to adding baseline controls, and to restricting to households
reached in the follow-up survey, respectively.
As a ￿rst test for the screening e⁄ect, ￿gure 3 shows coe¢ cients from a regression of self-
reported use among buyers on dummies for o⁄er price, controlling for transaction price ￿xed e⁄ects
to hold constant any psychological e⁄ects. Consistent with a screening e⁄ect, the ￿gure shows an
upward-sloping relationship between o⁄er price and the likelihood of use among buyers.
Table 3 presents more parametric estimates of the e⁄ect of raising the o⁄er prices on the
propensity to use Clorin in drinking water among buyers. We estimate linear probability models
relating the probability of use (both self-reported and measured) to o⁄er prices, with transaction
price ￿xed e⁄ects in all speci￿cations to control for any sunk-cost e⁄ects.54 The regressions in
panel A of the table show that, conditional on transaction price, an increase of 100 Kw in the o⁄er
price leads to a statistically signi￿cant 3 to 4 percentage point increase in Clorin use among buyers,
52Adding a quadratic term in o⁄er price does not improve the model￿ s ￿t, suggesting that, within the range of
experimental variation, there are no detectable nonlinearities in demand. Estimated marginal e⁄ects from probit
models are virtually identical to those reported in table 2 (see appendix B).
53The regression has a constant of about 0:96, indicating that the model predicts that 96 percent of households
would accept a free Clorin giveaway delivered to their door. This estimate is statistically indistinguishable from unity,
which is consistent with our a priori intuition that few households would turn down a free bottle of Clorin.
54Probit models of use yield nearly identical estimates. Our results are also robust to allowing for interactions
between o⁄er and transaction prices in a⁄ecting Clorin use. See appendix B for details.
25corresponding to an economically nontrivial usage elasticity (at the mean price and usage) of 0:3
to 0:4.
In principle, there are two possible reasons for our ￿nding that higher o⁄er prices lead to
greater use among buyers. The ￿rst is that higher o⁄er prices select buyers whose observable
characteristics￿ education, wealth, etc.￿ are predictive of Clorin use. The second is that higher
prices select buyers with a greater unobservable (to the econometrician) propensity to use. In
addition to its intrinsic relevance to the economics of private information, separating these two
mechanisms is potentially important for policy, because if the screening e⁄ect is driven largely by
selection on observables, the targeting e⁄ects of pricing may be largely achievable through programs
that target distribution of Clorin based on observable demographics.
In panel B of table 3, we test between these explanations, by re-estimating the speci￿cations of
panel B, but including as covariates a vector of household demographic characteristics measured as
of our baseline survey.55 These demographics are of the sort that might be available in a detailed
household census. The coe¢ cients on o⁄er price in panel B are only about 10 percent smaller than
those in panel A, indicating that the vast majority of the screening e⁄ect we estimate is driven by
higher prices selecting buyers with a relatively high unobservable propensity to use Clorin.
Note that, in contrast to a typical randomization-based regression, asking how including observ-
ables a⁄ects the coe¢ cient of interest in table 3 is not a test of the validity of our randomization.
This is because the regressions in table 3 are run conditional on purchase, rather than uncondi-
tionally, so that we are asking how correlated are observables with o⁄er prices conditional on the
decision to buy. Recall, however, that a nearly marginally signi￿cant relationship between o⁄er
price and baseline use is visible in the balancing tests in appendix table 2. We have therefore
con￿rmed (results not shown) that screening e⁄ects are comparable in magnitude and statistical
signi￿cance to those in panel A of table 3 when we include the entire range of baseline character-
istics in the model, including baseline use. We use the more restricted set of characteristics in the
table to more accurately represent the types of household data that might plausibly be available
to marketers of Clorin. (We have also re-estimated our screening model dropping households that
55Note that 9 respondents refused to answer one or more demographic survey questions. To verify that the slight
di⁄erence in sample composition between panels A and B does not explain the di⁄erence in coe¢ cients, we have
re-estimated the speci￿cations in panel A of table 3, excluding the 9 observations with missing values of one or more
demographic characteristics, and ￿nd virtually identical results, as expected.
26had Clorin at home as of the baseline, and ￿nd, if anything, stronger evidence of screening e⁄ects
on the restricted sample. See appendix A for details.)
The ￿ndings in table 3 imply that a household￿ s willingness-to-pay is informative about its
propensity to use Clorin, over and above what is available in a vector of household demographics.
A related (but di⁄erent) question is whether demographics are more or less predictive of use than
willingness-to-pay. This is similar to asking whether a model relating use to demographics has a
higher or lower R2 than a model relating use to willingness-to-pay. In practice, however, because
we do not observe willingness-to-pay directly, comparing the ￿t of these two models using R2 is not
possible. An alternative approach, which we adopt, is to ask whether a hypothetical distribution of
Clorin in which it is given to the households with the highest predicted use (based on demographics)
achieves more or less use among recipients than an equivalently selective pricing scheme (i.e., a
pricing scheme that distributes Clorin to an equal number of households).
To implement this comparison, we ￿rst estimate a linear probability model relating use among
buyers to our set of household demographics. From this model, we obtain a predicted use d usei
for each household i. Let x(￿) be the percent of households buying at o⁄er price ￿ predicted by
the demand model in column (1) of table 2. After ranking households by predicted use d usei, we
calculate, for each o⁄er price ￿, the share of buyers reporting use at follow-up among the house-
holds in the top x(￿) percent by predicted use. This allows us to compare the top households by
willingness-to-pay and the top households by predicted use at the same percentiles of the respective
distributions. For example, at an o⁄er price of 300 Kw, our demand model predicts that 76 percent
of households will buy. We therefore compute reported Clorin use among the top 76 percent of
buyers, ranked according to predicted use. Appendix ￿gure 2 shows the resulting usage rates by
o⁄er price, normalized relative to the rate at 300 Kw. As the ￿gure shows, the data exhibit signi￿-
cantly more slope with respect to willingness-to-pay than with respect to household demographics.
The di⁄erence in observed use between buyers at 800 Kw and buyers at 300 Kw is more than four
times larger than the analogous di⁄erence between households categorized by predicted use.
Our data also allow us to study directly how the observable characteristics of buyers change with
the o⁄er price (results not shown). In contrast to concerns that pricing leads to distribution to the
￿richest of the poor,￿we do not ￿nd that buyers at higher prices are wealthier or more educated.
27This result may of course be sensitive to our choice of a relatively inexpensive product. Using two
crude proxies for a household￿ s potential for health gains from drinking water use￿ the number of
children below age 5 and a dummy for whether the female head of household is pregnant￿ we ￿nd
no evidence that those with greater potential for health gains have a greater willingness-to-pay for
Clorin. Again, this result must be taken with caution, as our survey was not designed optimally to
measure the propensity for health gains from drinking water use.
6 Evidence on Sunk-Cost E⁄ects
In this section, we use variation in the transaction price to test for a sunk-cost e⁄ect. Sunk-
cost e⁄ects arise in our model because using Clorin in drinking water rationalizes the household￿ s
decision to buy Clorin. Because the psychic cost of failing to rationalize the purchase decision is
greater the more costly was the purchase, the model predicts that the likelihood of use (conditional
on purchase) is rising in the transaction price, holding the o⁄er price constant.
Figure 4 graphs the relationship between transaction prices and use at follow-up, holding con-
stant the o⁄er price using ￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿gure shows no consistent evidence that paying more
for Clorin increases use.
To test these hypotheses more formally, in table 4 we estimate regression models relating the
probability of Clorin use at follow-up to the transaction price, including o⁄er price ￿xed e⁄ects
to control for di⁄erences in the composition of buyers at di⁄erent prices. Because our analysis of
balance (in section 4) suggests the possibility that transaction prices are statistically related to
baseline use, we include a full set of baseline controls in all models.
In addition to testing for an e⁄ect of transaction prices on use, our data also allow us to relate
any e⁄ects we ￿nd to a crude measure of the household￿ s psychological propensities. At the end of
our follow-up survey, we included a series of hypothetical choices designed to mirror the types of
questions frequently used to elicit sunk-cost e⁄ects in the existing literature:56
Suppose you bought a bottle of juice for 1,000 Kw. When you start to drink it, you
56We placed these questions at the end of the survey in case these questions revealed anything about the study￿ s
hypotheses. Note that, in contrast to the most typical hypothetical-choice studies of sunk-cost e⁄ects, we employ
a within-subject, rather than between-subject design. We chose this approach because it allows us to more cleanly
classify households into ￿sunk-cost￿and ￿non-sunk-cost￿groups.
28realize you don￿ t really like the taste. Would you ￿nish drinking it?
Participants were able to answer yes or no, and could provide additional comments if they liked.
After this question, we asked two similar follow-up questions of all participants, one for the case
of a 5,000 Kw bottle of juice, and one for the case of a 500 Kw bottle.57 Consistent with existing
evidence, we ￿nd that households in our sample do display sunk-cost e⁄ects in their responses to
these questions, with over 20 percent of respondents reporting that they would ￿nish the juice at
5,000 Kw but not at 1,000 Kw, or that they would ￿nish it at 1,000 Kw but not 500 Kw.58
Panel A of table 4 follows the model in testing for an e⁄ect of the transaction price on the
likelihood of Clorin use at follow-up (both self-reported and measured), holding the o⁄er price
constant. Consistent with ￿gure 4, there is no evidence of such an e⁄ect. Our point estimates (in
speci￿cations 1A and 4A) indicate an e⁄ect of transaction price on use that is small in magnitude
and inconsistently signed. Our con￿dence intervals allow us to rule out positive e⁄ects on the
probability of use greater than 3:6 percentage points (self-reported use) or 1:9 percentage points
(measured use) per 100 Kw. These intervals rule out sunk-cost e⁄ects equal in size to the point
estimates of the screening e⁄ect that we report in table 3.59
In speci￿cations (2A) and (5A) of table 4, we focus speci￿cally on households that display
the sunk-cost e⁄ect in our hypothetical choice scenario, and again ￿nd statistically insigni￿cant
point estimates with no consistent sign. The di⁄erences in coe¢ cients between sunk-cost and non-
sunk-cost households are statistically insigni￿cant and inconsistently signed, suggesting no clear
relationship between hypothetical choice behavior and the observed response to transaction prices.
Overall, then, our data do not provide evidence of sunk-cost e⁄ects as predicted by the model.
We also designed our randomization to test a secondary hypothesis, suggested to us by NGO
personnel, namely that paying something results in more drinking-water use than paying nothing.
57To isolate sunk-cost e⁄ects from informational e⁄ects of prices, the follow-up questions emphasized that the
juice in question was the same bottle of juice regardless of the price we speci￿ed. For example, the second question
asked ￿Now suppose you actually had paid 5,000 Kw for that bottle of juice...Would you ￿nish drinking the bottle?￿
Surveyors were instructed to emphasize the word that, thus stressing the fact that this question refers to the same
bottle as in the question about 1,000 Kw.
58Twelve percent of respondents reported that they would ￿nish drinking the juice if it cost 500 Kw, as against 14
percent who said they would ￿nish it had it cost 1,000 Kw, and 32 percent who said they would ￿nish drinking it at
5,000 Kw. The di⁄erences among these groups are all highly statistically signi￿cant in paired t-tests.
59A formal test of the equality of the causal and screening e⁄ects, incorporating the statistical uncertainty in both
estimates, yields p-values of 0:233 (self-reported use) and 0:072 (measured use).
29In panel B of table 4, we estimate models paralleling those in panel A, using a dummy for whether
the household paid a positive transaction price as our key independent variable. As in panel A,
we cannot rule out the null of no e⁄ect of the act of paying on drinking-water use. However, in
contrast to panel A, the point estimates in panel B are large and positive, and in general larger
among sunk-cost than non-sunk-cost households. Therefore, while our data show no evidence of an
e⁄ect of an act of paying, they are at least consistent with such an e⁄ect, suggesting the need for
further research.60
7 Robustness and Interpretation
Below, we use several pieces of evidence from our study to test the validity of the maintained
assumptions of our model.
E⁄ect of transaction price on purchase decisions. It is crucial to the interpretation of our results
that households were not aware of their ￿nal transaction price when deciding whether to purchase
Clorin from us. We can test for such a lapse by asking whether transaction prices a⁄ected demand,
after controlling for the o⁄er price. Estimates of a linear probability model of demand indicate
that, after controlling for o⁄er price, a household￿ s ￿nal transaction price had no statistical e⁄ect
on its propensity to purchase Clorin (results not shown).61
Income e⁄ects of transaction prices. If paying more for Clorin reduced household wealth sig-
ni￿cantly, this could in principle attenuate the sunk-cost e⁄ect (though not the screening e⁄ect).
As a simple test for this possibility, we have tested for sunk-cost e⁄ects among those in our sample
with above-median wealth (as proxied by durables ownership). Even among this group, there is no
60As a more direct test of the practitioner hypothesis that ￿when products are given away free, the recipient often
does not value them or even use them￿ (PSI, 2006), we have also split the sample according to respondents￿self-
reported agreement with the statement that ￿I value something more if I paid for it.￿We ￿nd that the estimated
e⁄ect of paying a positive transaction price on Clorin use is far larger among those who report strong agreement with
the statement than those who do not, with the e⁄ect on self-reported use becoming statistically signi￿cant (p = 0:046)
in the sample of those reporting strong agreement (results not shown). In our second follow-up survey, we also ￿nd
some evidence of an e⁄ect of the act of paying on Clorin use, using a somewhat more precise measure of chlorination
(results not shown).
61This lack of statistical signi￿cance is not due to a lack of power: an F-test de￿nitively rejects the null hypothesis
of equal e⁄ects of o⁄er and transaction prices (p < 0:001). We have also conducted this test separately for each of the
six marketers involved in our experiment. In no case is there a statistically signi￿cant negative e⁄ect of transaction
price on purchase probability. In one case, there is a marginally statistically signi￿cant positive e⁄ect (p = 0:095) of
transaction price on purchase probability. Such a ￿nding is not surprising given that we execute six separate tests,
and the direction of the e⁄ect is not consistent with the idea that household demand responded to the transaction
price.
30evidence of a sunk-cost e⁄ect, providing further evidence that attenuation due to income e⁄ects is
unlikely to be a major confound. Relatedly, interaction regressions show no evidence that the e⁄ect
of the transaction price di⁄ers with our proxy for household wealth. In addition to its relevance
for the issue of income e⁄ects, this test also provides some (admittedly crude) evidence against
the view that sunk-cost e⁄ects are present only when the amount at stake is large relative to the
household￿ s income.
Informational e⁄ects of o⁄er and transaction prices. If, despite our design precautions, higher
o⁄er or transaction prices were taken to be evidence that Clorin is a better product, and favorable
beliefs induce more product use, then our estimates could be confounded. To test for such an e⁄ect,
we can take advantage of the presence in our follow-up survey of several measures of respondent
attitudes toward Clorin. In particular, the survey asks the respondent (on an agree/disagree scale)
whether water puri￿cation solution is easily available, whether it makes the water taste bad, and
whether it is an e⁄ective way to prevent diarrhea. None of these scales is statistically signi￿cantly
a⁄ected by either the o⁄er or transaction price, and an index that averages all three is also una⁄ected
by our treatments.62 Moreover, controlling for this index in our main speci￿cations leaves our key
conclusions unchanged (see appendix B).
A related possibility is that households￿beliefs about Clorin prices were impacted by our ex-
perimental treatment. To test for this confound, we asked Clorin buyers in the follow-up how much
they usually pay for a bottle of Clorin, and we asked those who reported not buying Clorin how
much they would expect to pay for a bottle. We ￿nd no e⁄ect of o⁄er or transaction prices on
participants￿responses to these questions.63
Marginal cost fallacy. For the households in our survey, the marginal cost of using Clorin is
determined by the market replacement price, not by the transaction price. However, it may be that
households psychologically perceived the cost of using Clorin to be higher when their transaction
price was higher, which could attenuate sunk-cost e⁄ects and explain our failure to ￿nd an e⁄ect of
62Among households that report never having used Clorin as of our baseline survey, who might be expected to
know the least about the product, there is no evidence of an e⁄ect of o⁄er price on our aggregate quality index. We
do ￿nd some evidence that higher transaction prices (somewhat counterintuitively) worsen attitudes towards Clorin
on the sample of never-users, but this result is only marginally statistically signi￿cant (p = 0:089).
63In the second follow-up survey, we asked all respondents how much they would expect to pay for a bottle of
Clorin in the future. We again ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant relationship between responses to this question and
the transaction price at which the household purchased Clorin.
31the amount paid. To assess this possibility, we included in our follow-up survey a question designed
to get at a household￿ s propensity to behave in this way. In particular, we asked respondents to
evaluate the statement ￿When I buy something that is expensive, I try to use it sparingly,￿on an
agree/disagree scale. Comparing households that did and did not agree strongly with this statement
reveals no evidence that the e⁄ect of transaction price on use is higher for households that do not
agree with the statement (results not shown).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we report evidence from a ￿eld experiment in Lusaka, Zambia, designed to test
the e⁄ect of prices on the use of Clorin, a socially marketed drinking water disinfectant. Our
experimental design permits us to separately test for two e⁄ects of prices: a screening e⁄ect (higher
prices change the mix of buyers), and a sunk-cost e⁄ect (higher prices induce greater use among
those who buy). We ￿nd strong evidence of screening e⁄ects: raising the price of Clorin attracts
buyers with a signi￿cantly greater propensity to use Clorin in their drinking water, indicating a
positive correlation between willingness-to-pay and the propensity to use Clorin in drinking water.
By contrast, we do not ￿nd evidence for sunk-cost e⁄ects: holding constant the distribution of
willingness-to-pay, raising the price at which a household transacts does not a⁄ect its propensity to
use Clorin in drinking water. Our results thus imply, at best, a limited role for sunk-cost e⁄ects in
the domain of health product use, while providing strong support for the hypothesis that households
have private information about their use propensities that is re￿ ected in willingness-to-pay.
Our ￿ndings therefore cast doubt on justi￿cations for health product pricing based on sunk-
cost e⁄ects, while suggesting a possible role for prices as an allocative tool. As we have stressed,
however, these implications must be taken with caution. They depend, in part, on the health (and
other) consequences of non-drinking-water uses of Clorin, which to our knowledge have not been
adequately explored in the medical literature. Moreover, while our study focuses on two important
channels through which pricing policy may in￿ uence the use of health products in developing
countries, we abstract from several others, most notably the informational role of prices in the
introduction of new goods, and the role of prices in permitting NGOs to access retail distribution
32networks. Carefully evaluating the role of these channels remains an important area for future
research.
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36A Appendix: Intertemporal Implications of the Model
In the model, realized transaction prices ~ pit0 in period t0 will not a⁄ect purchase or use behavior in
any period t 6= t0: sunk-cost e⁄ects are localized to the period in which the transaction occurs. The
model does, however, have implications for the relationship between o⁄er prices pit0 conditional
on purchase in period t0 and purchase and use behavior in periods t 6= t0. In this appendix we
brie￿ y summarize those implications. We also provide some empirical tests using data from our
baseline survey, reported in appendix table 4. The baseline period can be thought of as a reasonable
approximation to period t0￿1, in that any household owning Clorin as of the baseline survey would
have purchased it from a retailer (or health clinic).64 It is worth noting, however, that we did not
design our study to test these intertemporal implications, so the evidence reported below should
be thought of as preliminary.
Begin by considering the relationship between purchase behavior in the experiment and purchase
behavior in non-experimental periods. The model predicts that households purchasing in period
t0 are more likely to buy at other periods t 6= t0, the greater is the o⁄er price pit0 in period t0. To
see this, observe that, for households that purchase in the experimental period t0, we can write the
following for any non-experimental period t 6= t0:
Pr(b￿
it (R;vi) = 1 j b￿
it0 (pit0;vi) = 1;R;pit0) = Pr(vi ￿ v￿ (R) j vi ￿ v￿ (pit0))
with v￿ (R) ￿ v￿ (pit0). Because v￿ () is increasing in pit0, it follows directly that, conditional on
purchase in period t0, the probability of purchase in a period t 6= t0 is greater the greater is pit0.
Intuitively, the higher is a household￿ s demonstrated willingness to pay in period t0, the greater is
its likelihood of purchasing at the retail price in other periods. We present a test of this implication
in column (1) of appendix table 4. We measure purchase at baseline with an indicator for whether
our surveyor inventory indicates that the household had a non-empty Clorin bottle at the time of
the baseline survey. We ￿nd a marginally statistically signi￿cant positive relationship between o⁄er
price and baseline purchase (conditional on purchase at the marketing stage), consistent with the
model.
Consider next the relationship between purchase behavior in the experiment and use behavior in
non-experimental periods. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the model predicts that, conditional on
purchase in the experiment and in a non-experimental period, the experimental o⁄er price will be
unrelated to use in non-experimental periods. Formally, consider the expression for use conditional
on purchase in both the experimental period t0 and some non-experimental period t 6= t0:
Pr(d￿
it (R;vi;"it) = 1 j b￿
it0 (pit0;vi) = 1;R;pit0) = Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿R j vi ￿ v￿ (R) ^ vi ￿ v￿ (pit0))
That is, the set of households purchasing at both time t and time t0 are those for whom both
vi ￿ v￿ (R) and vi ￿ v￿ (pit0). However, because R ￿ pit0, v￿ (R) ￿ v￿ (pit0), so that the two
64It is also possible, in principle, to use data from our second follow-up survey to approximate purchase and use
behavior in period t
0 +1. In practice, however, some households still had the Clorin they purchased from us as of the
second follow-up. (Removing those households from the data is problematic, because the fact that they did not exhaust
all their Clorin is endogenous to their use behavior.) Moreover, an analysis of survey attrition shows a marginally
statistically signi￿cant negative relationship between o⁄er prices and the likelihood of contact in the second follow-up
survey (results not shown), suggesting further need for caution in interpreting experimental treatment e⁄ects from
the second follow-up survey. Nevertheless, we have conducted tests parallel to those in appendix table 4 using data
from our second follow-up. With the exception of the ￿rst implication (that o⁄er price will be related to purchase
behavior at the second follow-up conditional on purchase at the marketing stage), the conclusions are identical.
37conditions collapse to a single one:
Pr(d￿
it (R;vi;"it) = 1 j b￿
it0 (pit0;vi) = 1;R;pit0) = Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿R j vi ￿ v￿ (R))
= Pr(d￿
it (R;vi;"it) = 1 j R)
Therefore we predict no relationship between o⁄er price at time t0 and use behavior at time t 6= t0.
Intuitively, this result comes about because anyone willing to pay R should also be willing to pay
pit0 ￿ R, so that o⁄er prices in the experiment convey no new information about the composition
of households purchasing in non-experimental periods.65 Columns (2) and (3) of appendix table 4
present tests of this implication. Among those who had Clorin in their households as of the baseline
(our proxy for purchase at time t0 ￿1) and who purchased Clorin in the marketing stage (time t0),
there is no relationship between o⁄er price and self-reported or measured use at baseline, consistent
with the model. The coe¢ cients are small, negative, and statistically insigni￿cant.
Finally, consider the reverse question of how purchase behavior in non-experimental periods
a⁄ects our predictions for use in the experimental period. Following a logic parallel to the preceding
argument, it is straightforward to show that, conditional on purchase in a non-experimental period,
there should be no relationship between o⁄er price in the experimental period and use in the
experimental period, holding constant the transaction price. That is, the screening e⁄ect should
be absent for households that purchase in non-experimental periods. In equations, this is because:
Pr(d￿
it0 (~ pit0;vi;"it) = 1 j pit0; ~ pit0;b￿
it (R;vi) = 1) = Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿~ pit0 j vi ￿ v￿ (R) ^ vi ￿ v￿ (pit0))
= Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿~ pit0 j vi ￿ v￿ (R)):
By contrast, households that did not purchase in non-experimental periods will still display the
screening e⁄ect, although with a di⁄erent magnitude than the overall population:
Pr(d￿
it0 (~ pit0;vi;"it) = 1 j pit0; ~ pit0;b￿
it (R;vi) = 0) = Pr(vi + "it ￿ ￿￿~ pit0 j v￿ (pit0) < vi ￿ v￿ (R)):
We test these implications in speci￿cations reported in columns (4) through (7) of appendix table
4. Consistent with the model, among those who purchased at the marketing stage and had Clorin
at baseline, there is a statistically insigni￿cant relationship between o⁄er price and use at follow-up.
(We note, however, that due to small sample size our con￿dence intervals cannot rule out nontrivial
e⁄ects.) By contrast, among those who purchased at the marketing stage but did not have Clorin
in the home as of the baseline, there is a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between
o⁄er price and use.
B Appendix: Additional Robustness Checks
Appendix table 5 checks the robustness of our key results to a number of alternative speci￿cations.
For each alternative model, we show the e⁄ect of o⁄er prices on purchase probabilities, the e⁄ect
of o⁄er price on use among buyers, and the e⁄ect of transaction price (or a dummy for a positive
transaction price) on use among buyers. In speci￿cation (1), we reproduce the coe¢ cients from our
main tables for comparison.
Speci￿cation (2) of appendix table 5 checks the robustness of our results to using a probit
65Our model assumes a constant willingness-to-pay over time. A model with time-varying shocks to ci that are
known in advance of purchase to the household could yield a positive relationship between use in non-experimental
periods and experimental o⁄er price. However, given that the non-experimental periods we study are close in time
to the experimental period, constant willingness-to-pay over time may be a reasonable approximation.
38model of purchase and use, rather than a linear probability model. The table reports the estimated
marginal e⁄ects evaluated at the sample mean of the covariates. In all cases these estimates are
very similar to those we obtain in our main speci￿cation.
Speci￿cation (3) of appendix table 5 includes dummy variables for the six marketers we employed
to control for any marketer-speci￿c e⁄ects on purchase or use. Because the assignment of marketers
is statistically unrelated to the price treatments, including these controls does not meaningfully
a⁄ect our results. As a further check on this issue, we have estimated models of demand and use
in which we interact our price treatments with marketer ￿xed e⁄ects (results not shown). In every
case, F-tests indicate that the marketer-price interactions are jointly statistically insigni￿cant. Our
key results also survive (though with greater standard errors due to reduced sample size) when we
eliminate the data associated with each marketer, one marketer at a time (results not shown).
Finally, our results are robust to controlling for the date at which the household was reached by
our marketer (results not shown).
In speci￿cation (4) of appendix table 5, we check the robustness of our results to relaxing
the assumption that the e⁄ects of o⁄er and transaction prices do not interact in determining the
probability of Clorin use. Speci￿cally, we have re-estimated our key models of use, allowing the
e⁄ect of o⁄er price to di⁄er freely by transaction price, and allowing the e⁄ect of transaction price
to di⁄er freely by o⁄er price. By averaging the coe¢ cients across these separate speci￿cations, we
can obtain an estimate of the average e⁄ect of o⁄er and transaction prices that does not restrict
the e⁄ect of one price to be independent of the other. The results are similar to those in the main
speci￿cation.
In speci￿cation (5) of appendix table 5, we control explicitly for an index of the respondent￿ s
self-reported attitudes toward Clorin at follow-up (see section 7). Though this index could be
endogenous to our treatment conditions, including the index allows us to check whether any infor-
mational e⁄ects of prices might be confounding our estimates of the screening and sunk-cost e⁄ects.
Including this control does not meaningfully change any of our key coe¢ cients.
Speci￿cation (6) of appendix table 5 presents a set of ordered probit models, using as a de-
pendent measure the amount of free chlorine in the household￿ s drinking water as of the follow-up
survey. The direction and statistical signi￿cance of the ordered probit parameters are comparable
to those of the main speci￿cation. To permit a comparison of magnitudes, in square brackets we
report the implied marginal e⁄ect of a change in the key independent variable on the likelihood of
having at least some free chlorine. The implied marginal e⁄ects are quantitatively similar to those
in the main speci￿cation.
Speci￿cation (7) of appendix table 5 presents a set of ordered probit models, using as a depen-
dent measure an index of how recently the respondent reports putting Clorin in her household￿ s
drinking water.66 The estimates are similar to those of the main model in direction and statistical
signi￿cance. (A direct comparison of magnitudes is not possible because the dependent variable is
not in the same units as the coe¢ cients in our main speci￿cation.)
66In order of recency, the categories are: one week ago or more, between 48 hours and one week, between 24 and
48 hours, between 12 and 24 hours, between 6 and 12 hours, and within the last 6 hours.
39Figure 1 A bottle of Clorin

































Notes: Figure shows share of households purchasing Clorin in door-to-door marketing intervention, at dif-
ferent o⁄er prices (in Zambian Kwacha). Error bars re￿ ect ￿1 standard error.



















































Notes: Figure shows coe¢ cients from a regression of self-reported Clorin use at follow-up on dummies for
o⁄er price, with ￿xed e⁄ects for transaction price, for those households that purchased Clorin in our door-
to-door marketing exercise. Coe¢ cient on omitted category (o⁄er price = 300 Kw) is normalized so that
predicted share at sample mean of o⁄er price dummies is equal to the observed share using Clorin. Error
bars re￿ ect ￿1 standard error.



















































Notes: Figure shows coe¢ cients from a regression of self-reported Clorin use at follow-up on dummies for
transaction price, with ￿xed e⁄ects for o⁄er price, for those households that purchased Clorin in our door-to-
door marketing exercise. Coe¢ cient on omitted category (transaction price = 0 Kw) is normalized so that
predicted share at sample mean of transaction price dummies is equal to the observed share using Clorin.
Cells with transaction price of 500, 600, and 700 Kw have been aggregated to improve precision. Error bars
re￿ ect ￿1 standard error.
43Table 1 Distribution of o⁄er and transaction prices
O⁄er Price (Kw)
300 400 500 600 700 800 Total
Number of participants 226 227 227 227 227 126 1260
(percent of all participants) (17.94) (18.02) (18.02) (18.02) (18.02) (10.00) (100)
Transaction Price (Kw):
0 90 90 90 90 90 50 500
(39.82) (39.65) (39.65) (39.65) (39.65) (39.68) (39.68)
100 67 45 34 27 22 10 205
(29.65) (19.82) (14.98) (11.89) (9.69) (7.94) (16.27)
200 69 46 34 27 23 11 210
(30.53) (20.26) (14.98) (11.89) (10.13) (8.73) (16.67)
300 ￿ 46 34 28 23 11 142
(20.26) (14.98) (12.33) (10.13) (8.73) (11.27)
400 ￿ ￿ 35 27 23 11 96
(15.42) (11.89) (10.13) (8.73) (7.62)
500 ￿ ￿ ￿ 28 23 11 62
(12.33) (10.13) (8.73) (4.92)
600 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 23 11 34
(10.13) (8.73) (2.7)
700 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 11 11
(8.73) (0.87)
Notes: The ￿rst section of the table shows the distribution of participants across o⁄er prices, with percent of
total in parentheses. The remaining rows show the distribution of transaction prices conditional on a given
o⁄er price, with conditional percentages in parentheses. For example, the cell listed under an o⁄er price of
300 Kw and a transaction price of 200 Kw should be read to say that 69 households received an o⁄er price
of 300 Kw and a transaction price of 200 Kw, and that these 69 households represent 30.53 percent of the
226 households receiving an o⁄er price of 300 Kw.
44Table 2 Estimates of the demand for Clorin
Dependent variable: Household purchased Clorin (dummy)
(1) (2) (3)
Sample All All Follow-up
O⁄er price -0.0664 -0.0653 -0.0708
(100 Kw) (0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0099)
Constant 0.9640 0.9578 0.9892
(0.0516) (0.0520) (0.0547)
Baseline controls? NO YES NO
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.6116 0.6111 0.6135
Number of observations 1004 990 890
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models. ￿Baseline controls￿
includes baseline Clorin usage and water chlorination, general health behaviors and attitudes, household
demographics, and locality ￿xed e⁄ects, as in appendix table 2, standardized to have a sample mean of 0.
Fourteen households are missing data on one or more baseline controls due to questionnaire refusals. Column
(3) restricts the sample to respondents reached for the follow-up survey.
45Table 3 Evidence on screening e⁄ects
Panel A: Screening on subsequent use of Clorin
(1A) (2A)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
O⁄er price 0.0373 0.0321
(100 Kw) (0.0149) (0.0150)
Transaction price ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.5147 0.5332
Number of observations 546 542
Panel B: Screening conditional on baseline demographics
(1B) (2B)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
O⁄er price 0.0327 0.0293
(100 Kw) (0.0150) (0.0149)
Transaction price ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES
Baseline demographics? YES YES
Sample mean of dependent variable 0.5140 0.5366
Number of observations 537 533
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models with ￿xed e⁄ects for
transaction price, estimated on the sample of households that purchased Clorin in the door-to-door marketing
intervention and were reached for the follow-up survey. ￿Baseline demographics￿includes measures of age,
schooling, marital status, pregnancy, household composition, wealth, and locality ￿xed e⁄ects, as in appendix
table 2. Nine households are missing data on one or more baseline demographics due to questionnaire refusals.
We lack data on measured chlorination for 4 households due to a lack of stored drinking water for testing.
46Table 4 Evidence on sunk-cost e⁄ects
Panel A: Tests for sunk-cost e⁄ect
(1A) (2A) (3A) (4A) (5A) (6A)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Sample All Sunk-cost household? All Sunk-cost household?
Yes No Yes No
Transaction price 0.0097 0.0348 0.0042 -0.0071 -0.0106 -0.0079
(100 Kw) (0.0133) (0.0334) (0.0149) (0.0133) (0.0330) (0.0147)
Di⁄erence 0.0306 -0.0027
(sunk-cost vs. non-sunk-cost) (0.0366) (0.0361)
O⁄er price ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample mean of dep. var. 0.5140 0.4336 0.5354 0.5366 0.4732 0.5534
No. of obs. 537 113 424 533 112 421
Panel B: Tests for e⁄ect of act of paying
(1B) (2B) (3B) (4B) (5B) (6B)
Dependent variable Water currently treated Drinking water contains
with Clorin? free chlorine?
(follow-up; self-reported) (follow-up; measured)
Sample All Sunk-cost household? All Sunk-cost household?
Yes No Yes No
Transaction price > 0 0.0565 0.1840 0.0372 0.0318 0.0816 0.0240
(0.0442) (0.1030) (0.0496) (0.0440) (0.1020) (0.0493)
Di⁄erence 0.1468 0.0576
(sunk-cost vs. non-sunk-cost) (0.1144) (0.1133)
O⁄er price ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Baseline controls? YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample mean of dep. var. 0.5140 0.4336 0.5354 0.5366 0.4732 0.5534
No. of obs. 537 113 424 533 112 421
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are from linear probability models with ￿xed e⁄ects for
o⁄er price, estimated on the sample of households that purchased Clorin in the door-to-door marketing
intervention and were reached for the follow-up survey. ￿Baseline controls￿includes baseline Clorin usage
and water chlorination, general health behaviors and attitudes, household demographics, and locality ￿xed
e⁄ects, as in appendix table 2. We lack data on measured chlorination for 4 households due to a lack of stored
drinking water for testing. Estimates for sunk-cost and non-sunk-cost households are from fully interacted
models; estimates of the di⁄erences between the coe¢ cients for these samples are from interactions between
the relevant independent variable and a dummy for whether the household displays the sunk-cost e⁄ect in
hypothetical choices.
47Appendix Figure 1 Sample coupon from door-to-door marketing
600
Notes: Figure shows a sample discount coupon from door-to-door marketing experiment. Coupon shows the
￿nal price at which the bottle transacted.











0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6










































Greatest Willingness-to-pay Greatest Predicted Use
Notes: Top (blue) line shows share reporting Clorin use among buyers at or above each percentile of
willingness-to-pay, with willingness-to-pay distribution based on estimated demand model from column (1)
of table 2. Bottom (pink) line shows share reporting Clorin use among buyers at or above each percentile of
predicted Clorin use, with predicted use determined through an OLS regression of self-reported use on base-
line demographic characteristics (age, schooling, marital status, pregnancy, household composition, wealth,
and locality ￿xed e⁄ects, as in appendix table 2). Share of use at lowest percentile is normalized to 0.
49Appendix Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the baseline sample
(1) (2) (3)
Source Baseline survey Baseline survey DHS
Sample All Ages 15-49 Ages 15-49
Age 32.8257 30.1593 27.1425
(0.3130) (0.2254) (0.2948)
Years of completed schooling 6.6418 7.0285 7.2379
(0.1013) (0.1013) (0.1209)
Married? 0.8000 0.8327 0.5642
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0170)
Currently pregnant? 0.1143 0.1254 0.0754
(0.0090) (0.0099) (0.0091)
Total number of living children 3.1867 2.9484 2.1932
(0.0630) (0.0614) (0.0791)
Number of children in household under age 5 0.9619 0.9875 1.1767
(0.0245) (0.0253) (0.0365)
Household owns a radio? 0.5540 0.5721 0.6266
(0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0166)
Household owns a television? 0.4992 0.5151 0.5501
(0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0171)
Household owns a refrigerator? 0.1905 0.1940 0.2686
(0.0111) (0.0118) (0.0152)
Household owns a bicycle? 0.1000 0.1077 0.1213
(0.0085) (0.0092) (0.0112)
Household owns a motorcycle? 0.0008 0.0009 0.0012
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012)
Household owns a car? 0.0230 0.0258 0.0836
(0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0095)
Number of observations 1260 1124 849
Notes: Table shows means of variables, with standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) use data
from our baseline survey. Column (3) uses data on Lusaka residents from the 2001 Demographic and Health
Survey (DHS) of Zambia. Actual number of observations in columns (1) and (2) varies slightly across
variables due to questionnaire refusals.
50Appendix Table 2 Testing the balance of observables across treatment conditions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Marketing Purchased Clorin
Dependent variable O⁄er O⁄er Transaction Transaction
Price Price Price Price > 0
Water currently treated with Clorin? 0.1474 0.2040 -0.1171 0.0668
(baseline; self-reported) (0.1114) (0.1250) (0.1747) (0.0525)
Drinking water contains free chlorine? 0.0764 0.0150 0.3300 0.0643
(baseline; measured) (0.0892) (0.1003) (0.1412) (0.0425)
Use of soap before handling food 0.0032 -0.0881 0.2281 0.0860
(index) (0.1546) (0.1735) (0.2519) (0.0757)
Use of soap after using toilet -0.3067 -0.1992 0.0863 -0.0192
(index) (0.1593) (0.1782) (0.2564) (0.0771)
Attitude toward water puri￿cation -0.0828 -0.3628 0.5490 0.0645
(index) (0.2258) (0.2531) (0.3564) (0.1071)
Age in years 0.0032 0.0023 -0.0002 -0.0010
(0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0076) (0.0023)
Ever attended school? -0.0986 -0.1235 0.2510 0.1501
(0.1830) (0.2050) (0.2874) (0.0864)
Years of completed schooling 0.0097 0.0187 -0.0352 -0.0157
(0.0189) (0.0215) (0.0305) (0.0092)
Currently married? 0.0870 0.0381 -0.1274 0.0416
(0.1160) (0.1327) (0.1881) (0.0565)
Currently pregnant? -0.0118 0.0768 -0.0400 -0.0037
(0.1355) (0.1550) (0.2222) (0.0668)
Ever given birth to any children? -0.1571 -0.1471 0.2126 -0.0410
(0.1806) (0.2065) (0.2913) (0.0876)
No. of children in household under age 5 0.0474 0.0596 0.0904 0.0381
(0.0536) (0.0609) (0.0918) (0.0276)
No. of people in household -0.0196 -0.0106 -0.0377 -0.0042
(0.0193) (0.0214) (0.0298) (0.0090)
Share of durables owned 0.1286 0.0603 0.2612 0.0100
(0.2885) (0.3265) (0.4499) (0.1352)
Locality ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES YES YES
Fixed e⁄ects for o⁄er price? NO NO YES YES
Fixed e⁄ects for transaction price? YES YES NO NO
F-test that all coe¢ cients are 0 0.64 0.64 0.90 0.93
p-value of F-test 0.8719 0.8686 0.5802 0.5395
Number of observations 1244 990 605 605
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ￿Marketing￿refers to households reached for door-to-door marketing.
All variables measured as of baseline survey. Transaction price ￿xed e⁄ects excluded from F-test in columns
(1) and (2). O⁄er price ￿xed e⁄ects excluded from F-test in columns (3) and (4). Prices in units of 100 Kw.
51Appendix Table 3 Determinants of sample attrition
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All Marketing Purchased Clorin
Dependent variable Marketing Follow-up Follow-up Follow-up
O⁄er price (100 Kw) 0.0021 0.0022
(0.0073) (0.0069)
Transaction price (100 Kw) -0.0031 0.0063
(0.0068) (0.0080)
Transaction price > 0 0.0325
(0.0267)
Water currently treated with Clorin? 0.0074 -0.0122 -0.0092 -0.0121
(baseline; self-reported) (0.0302) (0.0267) (0.0338) (0.0338)
Drinking water contains free chlorine? 0.0269 0.0152 -0.0057 -0.0057
(baseline; measured) (0.0242) (0.0214) (0.0274) (0.0273)
Use of soap before handling food 0.0355 -0.0131 0.0004 -0.0010
(index) (0.0420) (0.0371) (0.0487) (0.0487)
Use of soap after using toilet -0.0268 -0.0069 -0.0231 -0.0220
(index) (0.0434) (0.0381) (0.0496) (0.0495)
Attitude toward water puri￿cation 0.0508 0.0965 0.0838 0.0852
(index) (0.0613) (0.0541) (0.0690) (0.0689)
Age in years 0.0016 0.0022 0.0034 0.0035
(0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Ever attended school? -0.0063 -0.0224 -0.0035 -0.0068
(0.0498) (0.0438) (0.0556) (0.0557)
Years of completed schooling -0.0052 0.0028 0.0078 0.0081
(0.0051) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0059)
Currently married? 0.0317 0.0214 0.0811 0.0789
(0.0314) (0.0283) (0.0364) (0.0364)
Currently pregnant? -0.0085 0.0215 -0.0410 -0.0412
(0.0369) (0.0331) (0.0430) (0.0429)
Ever given birth to any children? -0.0447 -0.0033 -0.0242 -0.0215
(0.0490) (0.0441) (0.0563) (0.0563)
No. of children in household under age 5 0.0133 0.0044 -0.0105 -0.0112
(0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0178) (0.0178)
No. of people in household 0.0074 0.0109 0.0121 0.0120
(0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0058) (0.0058)
Share of durables owned 0.1763 0.0638 0.0020 0.0033
(0.0784) (0.0697) (0.0870) (0.0869)
Locality ￿xed e⁄ects? YES YES YES YES
Fixed e⁄ects for o⁄er price? NO NO YES YES
Fixed e⁄ects for transaction price? NO YES NO NO
F-test that control coe¢ cients are 0 2.05 1.61 1.50 1.50
p-value of F-test 0.0060 0.0512 0.0837 0.0833
Number of observations 1244 990 605 605
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ￿Marketing￿refers to households reached for door-to-door marketing.
￿Purchased Clorin￿refers to households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing. All variables

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































53Appendix Table 5 Additional robustness checks
E⁄ect on E⁄ect on use:
purchase:
Speci￿cation O⁄er price Use measure O⁄er price Transaction price
(100 Kw) (100 Kw) (100 Kw)








(3) Marketer -0.0633 Self-reported 0.0351 0.0103
￿xed (0.0092) (0.0151) (0.0135)
e⁄ects Measured 0.0301 -0.0099
(0.0150) (0.0132)
(4) Average ￿ Self-reported 0.0381 0.0129
treatment (0.0148) (0.0143)
e⁄ects Measured 0.0324 -0.0108
(0.0150) (0.0148)
(5) Controlling for -0.0706 Self-reported 0.0341 0.0144
quality (0.0098) (0.0144) (0.0130)
assessments Measured 0.0311 -0.0057
(0.0149) (0.0133)
(6) Ordered probit Underlying parameter 0.0701 -0.0171
on free chlorine (Standard error) (0.0336) (0.0314)
[Implied marginal e⁄ect] [0.0273] [-0.0064]
(7) Ordered probit Underlying parameter 0.0695 -0.0121
on recency (Standard error) (0.0319) (0.0294)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See appendix B for details. E⁄ect of o⁄er price on purchase estimated
on sample of households reached during marketing. E⁄ect of o⁄er price on use estimated on sample of
households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing intervention, in a speci￿cation that includes
transaction price ￿xed e⁄ects. E⁄ect of transaction price (and positive transaction price) on use estimated on
sample of households that purchased Clorin during door-to-door marketing intervention, in a speci￿cation
that includes o⁄er price ￿xed e⁄ects and baseline controls (baseline Clorin usage and water chlorination,
general health behaviors and attitudes, household demographics, and locality ￿xed e⁄ects, as in appendix
table 2).
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